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There is a difference between who brings in income, who spends and manages money, and who 
finally benefits. All these aspects are important in determining how satisfied spouses are with 
their individual financial situation. Relying on Swiss Household Panel data from 2004 to 2013 
(N=1,810 couples), this assumption is tested by analyzing how women’s relative income and 
the management of economic resources within couples affect women’s and men’s financial 
satisfaction in the household. Results show that a change in the composition of total income in 
favour of women directly increases their financial satisfaction, net of household income, while 
men’s financial satisfaction increases up to the point at which women earn more than one third 
of the total income. Money management regimes serve as an important additional tool in 
creating and compensating for (dis)advantage between partners. The results are discussed in 
the context of traditional gender norms in the Swiss Society. 
 













There is a difference between who brings in income, who spends and manages money, and who 
benefits in the end. All these aspects are important in determining the individual financial 
situation of spouses. Focusing on the Swiss context, this paper aims to shed light on the role of 
intra-household sharing and income management practices for the financial satisfaction of men 
and women in heterosexual, married and cohabiting couples.  
The resource theory of power assumes that the economic attributes of partners have the 
potential to influence their decision-making and bargaining power in the household, with 
implications for individual financial well-being (Blood & Wolfe, 1960). Hence, the partner 
who earns more is more likely to have greater power and control over decision making and be 
better off financially. However, intra-household dynamics need to be examined in the context 
of the gender relations that characterize the household, as the gender identities of men and 
women might modify the relationship intrinsic to economic exchange. Finally, within-
household inequalities between partners could derive more from an individual’s access to 
money than their relative income: the management of money is a practical arrangement that 
has a social and ideological value (Zelizer, 1989) and is linked to the possibility of 
consumption.  
This article offers a microsociological perspective to analyze the intra-household accumulation 
of advantage and disadvantage between partners resulting from money management practices. 
Financial considerations are often studied through consumption or spending patterns. Reported 
satisfaction with the financial situation, instead, measures how individuals really feel about 
their standard of living. Our goal is to study to what extent individual satisfaction with the 
financial situation within Swiss households is associated with the relative earnings of partners, 
the role of both partners in the management of economic resources, and the gender dimension 
of such relations. We argue that the relative earnings of partners and their money management 
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regime should be considered together to understand the mechanisms leading to financial 
satisfaction.  
Our analysis thus makes a theoretical and empirical contribution to the existing literature. First, 
we study to what extent individual financial satisfaction is associated with the relative income 
of partners, and how gender further shapes the exchange of resources. Second, we combine the 
theories of bargaining power within the relationship with a sociological theory of the role of 
money management systems. Third, we rely on measures of financial satisfaction in a 
longitudinal perspective. Finally, the focus on Switzerland allows us to analyze an unexplored 
social and economic context characterized by a substantial gender gap in labor force 
participation and the persistence of traditional attitudes regarding gender roles (OFS, 2017).  
Indeed, according to the World Value Survey (2005–2008) and the recently published Swiss 
National Statistical Data (OFS, 2017), traditional values in relation to gender roles are more 
supported by men and women in Switzerland than in other Western European countries (Kelso, 
Cahn, & Miller, 2012). Traditional attitudes towards employment dominate to the extent that 
very few Swiss couples are, in fact, dual-career couples (Levy, Buhlmann, & Widmer, 2007). 
According to the data, the employment rate of women was relatively stable at around 70% over 
the first decade of the 2000s (OECD, 2013), yet there are differences between men and women 
in the labor market due to the character of paid work: for instance, in 2009 58% of Swiss 
women worked part-time in comparison to 13% of Swiss men. The high gender gap in wages 
is largely due to horizontal segregation (Suter et al., 2016), with a greater presence of women 
in low-paid jobs (Kelso, Cahn, & Miller, 2012). These macro conditions set the stage for the 
micro conditions of women within their households and influence the division of family tasks: 
women are the main caretakers within the family, while men are the economic earners (Vitali 
& Arpino, 2016).  
5 
 
In the next sections we present our theoretical background and our research hypotheses, then 
we introduce and discuss our results.  
FINANCIAL WELL-BEING AND INTRA-HOUSEHOLD SHARING 
Historically, financial considerations have been of great significance for research on intra-
household sharing. These are captured through various individually assignable outcomes, such 
as material conditions and consumption. However, many have shown that material 
achievements and income are not necessarily the most important reflections of financial well-
being (Stiglitz, Fitoussi & Durand, 2018; Stutzer & Frey, 2010). Instead, it is suggested that 
“reported happiness is one step closer than objective variables like income or goods to the 
subjective states real people experience” (Konow, 2003, p. 286). In this article, we study 
specifically economic well-being, defined as an individual’s evaluation of their personal 
financial situation, which we use interchangeably with the term “financial satisfaction.” This 
is considered one of the most important components of the broader concept of overall life 
satisfaction, which also includes health and employment satisfaction (van Praag, Frijters, & 
Ferrero-i-Carbonell, 2003). 
Only a few studies have used financial satisfaction to directly analyze the effect of intra-
household allocations of financial resources. Previous research in different European contexts 
has generally found that after controlling for family income women are more satisfied 
financially the more income they bring to the household (Alessie, Crossley, & Hildebrand, 
2006; Bonke & Browning, 2009; Newman, Delaney, & Nolan, 2008). Also, Lersch (2017) 
recently showed that younger generations of German women and men are more satisfied with 
their personal wealth than with the wealth of their partners. On the contrary, Hajdu and Hajdu 
(2018) revealed in the Hungarian context that neither men nor women view the higher earning 
potential of women positively. Instead, the negative association between a woman’s relative 
income and financial well-being results from traditional gender norms and breadwinning 
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culture. Moreover, in a recent study of long-term US trends, Eirich and Robinson (2017) find 
little proof of resource exchange theory. They instead suggest that social psychological 
processes are the reason why individuals are more financially satisfied if they out-earn their 
partners, independent of gender.  
When it comes to Switzerland, the literature on financial satisfaction and household dynamics 
is scarce. Only Bütikofer and colleagues (2009) used data on financial satisfaction from the 
Swiss Household Panel survey as a measure of the indirect utility received from individual 
consumption. The article reports that individual contributions influence the financial 
satisfaction of women through the dynamics of bargaining. The main focus of previous 
research has been on income division in the context of the resource theory of power (Blood & 
Wolfe, 1960, see next section). None of the previous studies, however, extends to an analysis 
of the association between money management regimes and individual financial satisfaction. 
We aim to fill the gap by linking information on individuals’ income to money management 
and the individual financial situation in the Swiss context.  
THE RELEVANCE OF INCOME AND THE GENDER PERSPECTIVE 
The resource theory of power assumes that human capital and the economic characteristics of 
partners, such as income sources, education, and employment, influence shared decision 
making (Himmelweit et al., 2013). This challenges the perspective of the economic model of 
the family in which it is considered a single unit without intra-household inequality (Becker, 
1981). The resource theory predicts that the more women earn, the more control over decision 
making they will be able to exercise (Blood & Wolfe, 1960; McElroy & Horney, 1981). 
Additional factors with the potential to affect the within-household distribution of economic 
resources have been identified as wage levels, non-labor incomes, and individual and 
household characteristics (Himmelweit et al., 2013). In such a framework, the economic 
exchange of assets is gender neutral, and should affect both men and women equally. Higher 
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earnings or the greater human capital potential of women would lead to an improved bargaining 
position in the household; yet, men with higher assets would also gain greater bargaining 
power.  
However, the literature consistently shows that gender ideologies about how men and women 
are supposed to act in the labor market also influence the individual contribution of partners 
(Zelizer, 1989). Women’s contributions may have a different “value” for the family, due to the 
dominant “male as breadwinner” trope. This occurs if a woman’s income is supplementary and 
thus cannot balance out her husband’s contribution (Tichenor, 2005); it is one of the reasons 
why in some households women have little power in decision making despite earning their own 
income. Thus, women who earn more than their partners (so-called “breadwinning wives”) 
might be in a better position than their counterparts who earn less, as they might be able to 
negotiate better within their households (Burgoyne, 2004).  
However, empirical evidence across countries suggests the possibility of the opposite result: 
breadwinning wives voluntarily limit their power in decision making in order to maintain the 
gender role equilibrium within the couple, which is defined by traditional gender norms (for 
more on gender deviance neutralization theory, see Sonnenberg, Burgoyne, & Routh, 2011; 
Tichenor, 1999; West & Zimmerman, 1987). Similarly, men may react to atypical female 
behavior by reverting to a more traditional division of roles within the household to compensate 
for their perceived loss of masculinity (gender display theory, West & Zimmerman, 1987) or, 
in other words, by “doing gender.” 
THE FOCUS ON MONEY MANAGEMENT 
One way to explain how different ideologies and gender norms at the societal level apply in 
households is to focus on the role played by executive control over money and its effect on the 
bargaining process and the economic well-being of partners (Pahl, 1983; Vogler, 1998; Vogler 
8 
 
& Pahl, 1994). Systems of money management are related to differences in power and living 
standards between partners in combination with additional socio-demographic characteristics 
that initially influence the bargaining process, including individual income. In other words, 
gender inequalities in economic well-being could derive even more from women’s access to 
money than women’s relative income, because the ideological and cultural values of men and 
women are also among the factors that affect the management system. 
Vogler and Pahl (1994) identified the first typology of money management and established 
four main categories: female whole wage system, male whole wage system, housekeeping 
allowance system, and a joint pooling system with several subtypes. The female whole wage 
system is characterized by full female executive control of all income except her husband’s 
personal spending money. The male whole wage system reflects the breadwinner ideology and 
may negatively influence the financial well-being of women (Vogler & Pahl, 1994) when 
executive control is in the hands of the husband. The housekeeping allowance system allows 
for a wife’s set budget even though the rest of the money is managed by her husband. Finally, 
in the joint system, a relatively recent arrangement brought about by an increase in egalitarian 
relationships, couples pool and manage their money together. This arrangement is assumed to 
bring more equality in living standards (Vogler, Brockmann, & Wiggins, 2008). 
The aforementioned allocative regimes classification did not, however, incorporate separate 
spheres that represent more “individualized” forms of money management. In a more recent 
categorization, Vogler, Brockmann, and Wiggins (2006) introduced the independent 
management system where individuals are each responsible for their personal finances, arguing 
that it better reflects the changing ideology of gender, women’s involvement in the labor 
market, and new relationships forms such as cohabitation. 
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It has been argued that contemporary relationships are associated with greater gender equality 
(Giddens, 1992) and, consequently, that the management systems that characterize these new 
unions should bring a greater balance of power to the relationship. Indeed, the new, 
individualized model of money management arose from the advent of dual-earner 
relationships, which are quickly replacing the once dominant breadwinner model. Still, 
empirical confirmation that the new systems are associated with greater equality in gender 
relations has not arrived. On the contrary, several studies (Vogler, Brockmann, & Wiggins, 
2006, 2008; Vogler, Lyonette, & Wiggins, 2008) have found that separate management is 
similar to many traditional systems because the higher earner still exercises more control, 
which makes it less advantageous for women, who traditionally earn less.  
HYPOTHESES 
Starting from these theoretical concepts we define and test three major hypotheses.  
The first hypothesis deals with the extent to which individual satisfaction with their financial 
situation is associated with the relative earnings of partners. According to the resource theory 
of power, women’s income has the potential to change intra-household relationships between 
men and women and influence their financial well-being. Therefore, we expect the relative 
earnings of women to have a positive effect on their personal financial well-being but also to 
impact the well-being of their partner. There are two possible scenarios: if household income 
is shared equally between partners, both will benefit equally from the woman’s financial 
contribution (Becker, 1981). Alternatively, if household income is not shared equally, a 
woman’s higher income might increase her bargaining power and her financial well-being, 
whereas the bargaining power of her partner is lowered alongside his financial satisfaction 
(resource theory of power). The financial satisfaction of men particularly decreases as the 
contribution of women becomes more central and can no longer be designated as additional 
household income, thus endangering the role of men as breadwinners (Esping-Andersen, 2009, 
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Tichenor, 2005). This might be a scenario of gender display theory resulting from a particular 
loss in the bargaining power of men. The hypotheses are the following: 
H1a: An increase in the relative earnings of women positively affects their financial well-being, 
net of household income (resource theory of power) 
H1b: An increase in the relative earnings of women negatively affects the financial well-being 
of their partner, more so if a woman’s contribution exceeds that of her partner (gender display 
theory). 
Second, intra-household power is distributed by gender not only according to the relative 
earnings of partners, but also on the basis of their money management choices. Household 
money management outlines an individual’s responsibilities over personal and common 
finances in the household.3 In the past, the whole female management system was seen as a 
traditional form of management. It was typical for low-income, male breadwinner families, 
where the woman was not (or only to a lesser extent) contributing to the family income but had 
the difficult task of managing the scarce resources of the household (Vogler, 1998; Vogler, 
Brockmann, & Wiggins, 2008; Vogler, Brockmann & Wiggins, 2006). Men’s exclusive 
executive control over economic resources also reinforces gender roles and the role of the man 
as main breadwinner (Tichenor, 1999; West & Zimmerman, 1987). These traditional 
arrangements might hide inequalities in access to family resources by gender, such as personal 
spending money or food consumption (Vogler & Pahl, 1994).  
On the contrary, the pooling or shared management system includes both partners and results 
from egalitarian relationships (Burgoyne & Lewis, 1994; Sonnemberg et al., 2011; Yodanis & 
 
3 We rely on a simplified classification of money management regimes: female management as equal to the female 





Lauer, 2007). Relatedly, the couple can opt for the independent management system, which is 
characterized by individual control over personal income and separate responsibility for joint 
expenditures. Men or women who control their own finances may use the money differently 
and in their own favor, exercising more freedom in decision making. This form of money 
management reflects dual-earner and dual-career relationships and may thus bring more gender 
equality in the relationship (Vogler, Brockmann, & Wiggins, 2006, 2008; Vogler, Lyonette, & 
Wiggins, 2008). The actual hypotheses are as follows: 
H2a: The choice of money management exercised by women or men over the entire household 
(female or male whole wage) increases male financial satisfaction. 
H2b: The choice of shared or separate management of economic resources versus traditional 
money management increases women’s financial well-being net of their relative earning power 
but decreases male satisfaction (Vogler & Pahl, 1994). 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 provide two perspectives: that the ownership of income may be the major 
determinant of the relative well-being of partners (Burgoyne, 2004); and that management 
regimes could be a major source of inequality in a relationship (Nyman, 1999). However, the 
choice of management regimes may vary in relation to the individual ownership of income. 
For instance, the higher earning partner may be reluctant to give up control of access to money, 
thus refusing to pool income or cede control to their partner (Bonke & Uldall-Poulsen, 2007; 
Kenney, 2006).  
Our third hypothesis thus tackles how an interaction effect between women’s relative earnings 
and money management changes the individual financial satisfaction of men and women. We 
expect that earnings and money management interact and intervene, thus creating patterns of 
accumulation of advantage or compensation of disadvantage between partners. In other words, 
if a woman’s contribution is accompanied by favorable management regimes, this could lead 
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to the accumulation of the single effects of income and money management. On the contrary, 
a greater contribution by women may be accompanied by the male control of finances, which 
could decrease the positive effect of a woman’s contributions on her well-being but play a 
compensatory role in the case of her partner. 
The third hypothesis can be read as: 
H3a: The effect of a woman’s income contribution on her financial satisfaction will be greater 
if the couple uses joint management and/or separate management (accumulation of advantage 
for women).  
H3b: The effect of a woman’s income contribution on her financial satisfaction will be lower 
if the couple uses a male management system (reduced advantage for women). 
H3b: Male management system compensates for the loss of male bargaining power.  
METHODOLOGY  
DATA AND SAMPLE 
Using the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), we analyze how women’s relative income and the 
management of economic resources within couples affect women’s individual satisfaction with 
their financial situation as well as the satisfaction of their male partners. The SHP is a national 
representative survey of households in Switzerland designed to investigate economic, social, 
and demographic changes in the population. As an indefinite life panel, individuals living in 
the households are interviewed and asked the same questions annually. The SHP is composed 
of three samples, initiated in 1999, 2004, and 2013. The first sample (SHP_I) is a stratified 
random sample of private households and represents the non-institutional resident population 
in Switzerland. In 2004 and 2013 random samples of households were added to compensate 
for attrition (due to death, hospitalization, migration, and refusal). In the present study, we start 
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the observation window from the second panel sample (2004), since the sample initiated in 
1999 was impeded by a strong attrition rate. 
At the baseline of the original SHP (2004) sample, 5,074 households were followed annually 
(see Swiss Household Panel User Guide (1999–2017) for detailed information about attrition 
and non-response rate). The present study pools data from 2004–2013 (ten waves) and selects 
heterosexual individuals who declared that they were in a relationship (married or cohabiting) 
throughout the survey (23,838 year-couple observations or a total of 4,269 couples from 4,205 
households). We further apply age selection: to cover the potentially economically active 
population we thus include only women aged 18 to 60 years old, which leaves us with 3,585 
remaining couples. Deletion of missing values due to selection of covariates and participation 
in at least two waves further limits the sample to 2,451 and then 1,880 couples respectively. 
Finally, to avoid couples within the same household (e.g., parents, offspring with respective 
partners) being mutually influenced on the type and the effect of management regimes, only 
one couple per household was randomly selected and included in our sample. The age of male 
partners is restricted to 18–65. Our final sample includes 1,810 couples and 9,972 couple-year 
observations for the ten-year period.  
MEASUREMENTS 
Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable is self-reported satisfaction with the financial situation, which is a 
widely used measure of economic well-being (Bonke & Browning, 2009; Newman, C., 
Delaney, L. & Nolan, B., 2008). The variable used in our analysis is derived from the question: 
“Overall how satisfied are you with your financial situation, if 0 means ‘not at all satisfied’ and 
10 means ‘completely satisfied’?”. We analyze separately the individual financial satisfaction 
of women and their male partners. Consistent with the evidence reported in other national 
contexts (see Alesina, Di Tella, & MacCulloch, 2004, for general satisfaction in UK and US), 
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average satisfaction with the financial situation in our sample seems slightly higher among 
women than their male partners, with an average of 7.3, compared with 7.2 for men.  
Independent Variables 
Our first independent variable is the contribution of women to the total household finances. 
This information is obtained by dividing the woman’s total net yearly income by a couple’s 
total income and further multiplying it by 10; the variable is expressed in tenths of percentages. 
This variable considers the declared income from all sources, such as work, social transfers, or 
property (Voorpostel et al., 2016). We also include the squared relative income to capture 
possible non-linear relationships.  
Our second independent variable is the management of household finances in response to the 
question “Who manages the finances in your household?”. This is reported by the head of the 
household and is originally organized in six categories: 1) Me, 2) my partner, 3) another 
member of the household, 4) together, 5) separately, 6) other arrangement.4 Given that we 
focus only on couple dynamics, we exclude the cases in which couples’ finances are managed 
by another member of the household (3) or some other arrangement (6). This leaves us with 
four remaining categories: (i) woman, (ii) man, (iii) together, (iv) separately. We use this 
variable as a proxy for executive money management, although we acknowledge the difficulty 
of fully distinguishing executive functions from strategic decision making based on this data.  
Control Variables 
In the multivariate analyses, we control for a series of social and economic variables for both 
partners and households, as these may confound the relationship between the relative income, 
 
4 For the purpose of our analyses, we merge the responses for all heads of households, and create a unique 
classification assigning the type of management to men, women, and another member, joint, separate, or other. 
However, we acknowledge that there are statistically significant differences in answers between male and 




financial management, and financial satisfaction of women and their partners. Our first control 
variable is a couple’s income as a sum of women’s and men’s self-declared yearly personal 
total income, expressed as a logarithm. This variable enables us to control for the absolute 
levels of income in the couple while looking at changes in the composition of total income, as 
contributed by women or their partners. We control for education, labor market position 
(active, inactive, unemployed), and occupational class (ESeC) of women and their partners. 
We also control for marital status (whether the woman is married or is cohabiting) at each 
yearly interview and, if present, the number of biological and adopted children aged <17 years 
who are living in the household. Finally, because “satisfaction” is a broad concept and could 
include different life spheres, our models take into account satisfaction with “health status” (on 
a scale that ranges between 0 and 10, respectively “not at all satisfied” and “completely 
satisfied”). The satisfaction with health status intends to capture general satisfaction. It serves 
to control for over-reporting of financial satisfaction due to the changes in overall well-being, 
thus controlling for reverse causality. The summary of all variables is depicted in Table 1. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (means and percentages)  
Financial satisfaction Total Women Men 
Financial satisfaction   7.3 7.2 
Money management    
Woman 30.4   
Man 34.2   
Together 31.1   
Separately 4.3   
Women’s relative contribution 27.2   
Age   43 46 
Married 84.4   
Cohabiting 15.6   
Number of children 1.1   
Level of education    
Compulsory  10.2 3.5 
General training / apprenticeship  40.1 32.6 
Bachelor / technical / vocational  30.6 39.8 
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University  19.1 24.1 
Working status    
Employed  81.2 95.2 
Unemployed   1.5 0.8 
Inactive  17.3 4 
ESeC     
Larger employers, professionals  9.1 27.7 
Lower manager, higher technicians  23.5 22.6 
Intermediate occupations  23.8 9.6 
Small employers and self-employed  4.1 5 
Small employers and self-employed (agric.)  0.8 2.1 
Lower supervisors and technicians  1.5 3.1 
Lower sales and service  10.1 6.3 
Lower technicians  1.8 12.1 
Routine  6.2 5.4 
Other  19.1 6.1 
Satisfaction with health status    7.9 7.9 
Note: n= 9972 observations 
 
ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
We test our questions in a longitudinal framework with fixed effects panel models, which rely 
on within-subject information. They thus control for all observed and unobserved stable 
characteristics of individuals (e.g., Allison, 2009). Focus on repeated observations for the same 
individuals over time is particularly relevant for the analysis of subjective well-being because 
unobserved common determinants of subjective indicators of well-being, such as personality, 
may lead to spurious correlations. Furthermore, modelling the change in financial satisfaction 
rather than levels of financial satisfaction reduces bias attributable to persistent reporting errors. 
Because of these characteristics, fixed effect models have become the mainstream strategy with 
which to analyze satisfaction using a longitudinal perspective, often preferred to ordinary least 
squared regression and to growth curve models (Halaby, 2003). 
The following model specifications are chosen for the analysis: 
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𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑗_𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑋1𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑋2𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽4 𝑋1𝑋2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑗_𝑚𝑒𝑛 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑋1²𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑋2𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽4𝑋1𝑋1²𝑋2𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
where FSij is a woman’s or man’s financial satisfaction, 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖𝑗 is the woman’s relative income 
share, 𝛽2𝑋1²𝑖𝑗  is the quadratic term of the woman’s income share,  𝛽3𝑋2𝑖𝑗  is the money 
management regime, 𝛽4𝑋1𝑋2𝑖𝑗 represents the interaction between the money management 
regime and the woman’s income share, while 𝛽4𝑋1𝑋1²𝑋2𝑖𝑗 signifies the interaction between 
the money management regime, the woman’s income share, and the quadratic term of the 
woman’s income share. 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑗  includes the couple’s absolute income and all other time 
variant controls. Only the model specification for men includes a quadratic term since a 
graphical exploration of the data and specific tests show that the quadratic model does not 
deviate substantially from the linear specification of a woman’s income share on her financial 
satisfaction. 
The multivariate analysis is organized in two steps. We first analyze the overall relationship of 
the dependent and independent variables on the whole sample. In the second analysis, we repeat 
the models using different population subsamples according to the specific characteristics of 
couples: civil status of women (married versus cohabiting couples), the presence of children, 
and the position of the couple in the income distribution (households in the first and fourth 
quartiles of the distribution).5 
RESULTS 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES 
In our sample, the average woman’s contribution to a couple’s income is 27%. Notably, in 
1,220 observations (12.23% of the sample, equal to 233 couples) the relative income share of 
 
5 Detailed results available upon request. 
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women is above 50%. As regards money management, in more than 34% of cases it is men 
who manage the money for the entire household; it is rare that each member of the couple 
manages his/her own money separately (4%). Further, less than one third of couples manage 
their money together and 30% leave this responsibility to women. There is substantial variation 
of management regimes between and within couples over time, ranging from 2.17 % to 
39.53%. 
If we look at the contribution of women to the couple’s income by different regimes of money 
management, we observe heterogeneous patterns. Women contribute on average 27% of the 
family income when they are responsible for the management of household finances. However, 
the mean contribution of women corresponds to 22% of the total income in cases where their 
partner manages the household finances. Subsequently, women’s relative income share is 30% 
of the total income in households where money is jointly managed. Lastly, in relationships 
where men and women manage their finances separately, the mean percentage of women’s 
contribution is higher than in all other groups, and above the overall mean (slightly below 40%) 
(Figure 1). First impressions from these figures indicate that the type of regime correlates to a 
woman’s contribution to the couple’s finances: households that jointly manage finances are 
closer to an equal contribution of partners, whereas households where men manage the finances 
tend to be male breadwinner households. 





Source: Authors’ elaborations on SHPS ( 2004-2013), n= 9972 observations 
Figure 2 illustrates the overall connection of financial satisfaction with money management in 
our sample. It suggests that women are most satisfied in households where their partner 
manages the money, while they are least satisfied when the money is managed separately. On 
the other hand, men reach their highest level of satisfaction in households where they manage 
the household finances and approach the lowest level when the couple adopts a separate 
management system. 
FIGURE 2. MEAN LEVEL OF SATISFACTION WITH FINANCIAL SITUATION BY HOUSEHOLD MONEY 




























Source: Authors’ elaborations on SHPS ( 2004-2013), n= 9972 observations 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES 
The results of the multivariate analyses are shown in Table 2 (women’s financial satisfaction) 
and Table 3 (men’s financial satisfaction). As expected in hypothesis 1a), the baseline model 
(Model 1) indicates that the 10% increase in the relative income of Swiss women has a positive 
effect on their financial well-being, amounting to 1/5 of the standard deviation change in the 
financial satisfaction of women. The coefficient of a woman’s contribution to the total couple’s 
income remains positive and statistically significant, even if we account for all the other time-
variant covariates (Model 2 and 3) and after we include the interaction terms (Model 4). With 
every 10% increase in the income share contributed by a woman, her financial satisfaction goes 
up by 0.12 on a scale of 1–10. Once we include all the controls, the coefficient drops to 0.11 
but remains significant. On the contrary, the models of male partners’ financial satisfaction 
(Table 3) are not fully in line with hypothesis 1b), which states that the more a woman earns, 
the less male partners will be satisfied with their financial well-being. Instead, the relationship 
between a woman’s contribution and a man’s financial satisfaction is not linear. The quadratic 
term of women’s relative income is significant and negative, even though of small magnitude, 
suggesting a curvilinear relationship between women’s income share and men’s financial 
satisfaction. Men’s satisfaction thus increases up to a certain point and it decreases thereafter. 
This confirms in part our hypothesis of the existence of thresholds for women’s earnings after 
which male satisfaction declines.  
Figure 3 depicts the actual graphic relationship based on Model 3 in Tables 2 and 3. On the one 
hand, men’s financial well-being is around 7.2 when their partners do not contribute to the total 
couple’s income. It slightly increases when women partly contribute, but this positive trend 
ends when women’s contribution reaches or exceeds 29% of the couple’s income. On the other 
hand, women’s financial satisfaction linearly increases with their contribution. 
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FIGURE 3. PREDICTED FINANCIAL SATISFACTION OF WOMEN AND MEN (NET OF INDIVIDUAL 
CHARACTERISTICS). 
 
Note: Based on model 3 from Table 2 and 3. Woman’s financial satisfaction is a prediction 
from a linear model. 
In our second hypothesis, we suggested that women’s financial satisfaction would positively 
depend on the presence of joint management of finances and of independent management, net 
of everything else. The choice of an independent management system versus the joint 
management of money, however, seems to have a positive effect on women’s financial well-
being. It increases women’s financial satisfaction by 0.20 at 5% significance, corresponding to 
0.1 of the standard deviation change in satisfaction. Other types of management regimes are 
not found to significantly affect women’s financial satisfaction with respect to the joint 
management system. When it comes to men, the results demonstrate that male management of 
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their financial satisfaction increases 0.17 points if they alone manage the finances, in 
comparison to the reliance on joint management. 
In our final hypothesis, we expect some accumulation of women’s advantage if a higher income 
share is accompanied by specific management regimes, and compensation in men’s satisfaction 
if their breadwinner role is maintained through the favorable management regimes (e.g., men’s 
control over money). However, at first sight, the interactions are not significant in the model 
predicting woman’s financial satisfaction, implying that the effect of women’s relative income 
by money management regimes is not different from the main effect, with the exception of the 
difference between male and female management regimes which equals 0.07 at 5% 
significance.  
In the next step, we analyze the predicted financial satisfaction by management regimes for 
men and women along the scale of income share (Figure 4). The predicted values are based on 
Model 4 in Tables 2 and 3. In the models of financial satisfaction for women, the differences 
between management regimes are small when women’s contribution is lower (e.g., 
insignificant difference between all types of regimes at 20% and 30% share of the total income), 
but the gaps in satisfaction become larger and statistically significant as the share percentage 
increases. For instance, the financial satisfaction of women stands at 7.74 if they contribute 
50% of income and employ separate management regimes, in contrast to 7.46 when their 
partners manage the money for the same share. A similar difference holds between female and 
male control of finances. The latter indicates an accumulation effect for women if they manage 
the finances, which starts after women contribute approximately 35% of household income. 
The analyses thus partly confirm the hypotheses 3a and 3b, pointing in the direction of 
accumulation effects for particular money management regimes, although joint management is 
not found to be particularly advantageous for women.  
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FIGURE 4. PREDICTED FINANCIAL SATISFACTION OF WOMEN AND MEN BY MANAGEMENT 




Following closely upon our third hypotheses are the results for male partners. The interaction 
term between women’s income share and the female management of money is negative, -0.18 
(significant at 5%), and the interaction term between female management and the quadratic 
term of income share is positive and significant at 0.02. The significant interactions imply 
moderation of the main effect for the group of men whose households institute female 
management of finances: higher female income share is associated with the lower financial 
satisfaction of men (authors’ calculation, Table 3). Significant positive differences for men’s 
financial satisfaction are also found between all types of management and female management.  
For easier interpretation, predicted probabilities are plotted in Figure 4. A rather linear 
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for couples with female management of finances, while the relationship is quadratic when 
money is managed separately or by men. The distance between lines is statistically significant 
at 35% of woman’s income share. The gap in male satisfaction is greatest between joint 
management regimes and male control over money (see the gap at 60% of women’s 
contribution to total income) and between male and female management of finances (already 
above 35% of woman’s contribution). Overall, men who manage the household finances tend 
to be less affected by women’s income share: their satisfaction increases steadily and is more 
stable along the x-axis. The decline of male satisfaction in this group starts at a substantially 
higher level of female contribution (e.g. above 90%).  
Table 2. Linear Fixed Effect Models. Dependent Variable: Women’s Satisfaction with the 














  B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Woman’s relative 
contribution 
0.12*** (0.02) 0.12*** (0.02) 0.11*** (0.02) 0.11*** (0.02) 
Money management 
(Ref. Together) 
       
 
Woman   0.05 (0.06) 0.03 (0.06) -0.07 (0.10) 
Man   0.07 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06) 0.15* (0.09) 
Separately   0.20** (0.09) 0.21** (0.09) 0.12 (0.25) 
Interactions         
Woman* Woman’s rel. 
contr. 
      0.04 
(0.03) 
Man* Woman’s rel. 
contr. 




      0.02 
(0.06) 
Log income 0.18*** (0.04) 0.18*** (0.04) 0.12*** (0.04) 0.12*** (0.04) 
Constant 4.90*** (0.44) 4.86*** (0.44) 3.22*** (1.00) 3.22*** (1.00) 
Observations  9972  9972  9972  9972  
Number of couples 1810  1810  1810  1810  




Model 3 and 4 additionally control for:  age, number of children, level of education of both members of the couple, 
position in the labour market of both members of the couple, ESeC of both members of the couple and level of 
satisfaction with health status. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3. Quadratic Fixed Effect Models. Dependent Variable: Men’s Satisfaction with the 














  B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Woman’s relative contribution 0.09*** (0.03) 0.09*** (0.03) 0.07** (0.03) 0.12** (0.05) 












Money management (Ref. Together)         
Woman   0.06 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05) 0.26*** (0.10) 
Man   0.19*** (0.05) 0.17*** (0.05) -0.01 (0.09) 
Separately   0.02 (0.08) 0.04 (0.08) -0.68* (0.37) 
Interaction         
Woman* Woman’s rel. contr.       
-
0.18*** (0.06) 
Man* Woman’s rel. contr.        0.01 (0.05) 
Separately* Woman’s rel. contr.       0.30* (0.18) 
Woman* Woman’s rel. contr sq.       0.02*** (0.01) 
Man* Woman’s rel. contr sq.       0.01 (0.01) 
Separately* Woman’s rel. contr sq.       -0.03 (0.02) 
Log income 0.23*** (0.03) 0.23*** (0.03) 0.18*** (0.03) 0.17*** (0.03) 
Constant 4.38*** (0.39) 4.28*** (0.39) 1.80** (0.88) 1.81** (0.88) 
Observations  9972  9972  9972  9972  
Number of couples 1810  1810  1810  1810  
R-squared 0.01   0.01   0.03   0.03   
Model 3 and 4 additionally control for: Log income, age, number of children, level of education of both members 
of the couple, position in the labour market of both members of the couple, ESeC of both members of the couple 
and level of satisfaction with health status. 




Some important findings from previous regressions are repeated in models for different 
subgroups. The results indicate that married and cohabiting couples might adopt distinct 
sharing dynamics. For example, cohabiting couples seem to act as two units rather than one, 
and the role of a woman’s income in these relationships is more important for female financial 
well-being than in married couples. On the contrary, male financial satisfaction in cohabiting 
couples is independent of the female contribution to the couple’s income or the type of money 
management. Yet, married couples exhibit the patterns closer to the general models.  
An even stronger divide is visible when we consider the differences between childless couples 
and parents. The models for childless men are similar to the general patterns reported in the 
overall description. Parents (both men and women), however, react very differently to 
questions regarding their finances, and most of the previously explained relationships are 
substantially weaker or insignificant in this group. Finally, the differences between income 
groups are substantial. To give some examples, a woman’s contribution to the total household 
income is important for the well-being of women in poor families, but this is not the case in 
wealthy households. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This article highlights the robust connection between financial satisfaction and the income of 
each member of a couple, the role that each individual has in money management, and the 
interaction between these aspects. It also highlights the role of gender dynamics in determining 
financial satisfaction.  
We reach these results combining two perspectives on intra-household sharing: one that 
perceives individual income contributions as a major source of equality and well-being in a 
couple, and another that highlights the crucial role of money management within a couple for 
each individual’s well-being. We propose that the two mechanisms interact and that both 
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depend on dominant gender norms and ideology about how men and women are supposed to 
behave in the household and the labor market. When we look separately at Swiss men and 
women using rich data from the national panel survey, three interesting findings emerge: 
It matters who brings income into the household. A change in favor of women concerning the 
composition of a couple’s total income has an immediate effect on their financial satisfaction 
without any turning points dependent on specific thresholds. In other words, the allocation of 
power in the household seems to be sensitive to the ownership of income at all levels of 
women’s income share: a woman’s financial independence explains very well her financial 
well-being net of all other factors. Instead, a woman’s share of the couple’s income is related 
to the well-being of men in a reversed U-shaped manner. Men’s reaction to lower bargaining 
power is reflected through a decline in their financial satisfaction, but only once the woman 
earns more than one-third of the total income. This might be a point at which their role as 
breadwinner could be threatened, causing gender asymmetries.  
Hence, we find evidence of both the resource theory of power and, in part, gender display 
theory. This result is in line with other studies that find the existence of a threshold in women’s 
contribution to finances after which their income is perceived as more central than 
supplementary, and thus a potential threat to the bargaining position of men in their households 
(Bertrand et al., 2015). In the particular context of Switzerland, which is characterized by a 
strong male breadwinner ideology, the existence of a threshold after which the relative earnings 
of women become a disadvantage for men may not be very surprising. Yet, it is interesting that 
the threshold is lower than the 50% (out-earning) that we initially expected. 
It matters who manages the money. Money management is also a sign of power within the 
household, as some systems of money management reflect the breadwinning role of men or 
women. Interestingly, we find that a woman’s level of satisfaction with the financial situation 
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increases when the couple’s management is independent and further characterized by 
individual control over their own income and separate responsibilities for expenditure. In 
contrast to the literature, which finds separate management more similar to traditional money 
management practices, this result highlights that new individualized models of money 
management are indeed contributing to better living standards and the increased financial well-
being of women. Placed in a highly traditional context, separate management of finances might 
be a liberating instrument that enables more freedom in the allocation of resources, and less 
responsibility for the management of the resources of the whole household.  
Contrary to this, men’s control over finances through male management increases their 
financial satisfaction independently of women’s income contributions. Gender norms in the 
management of finances, which delegate an important role to men in executive control of 
money, tend to soften the impact of female earnings on men’s bargaining position. When 
masculinity is challenged, male control of finances is perhaps associated with comfort or 
security by reestablishing the traditional gender equilibrium. Systems of money management 
in their different forms thus contribute to the financial well-being of both partners. Our second 
hypothesis is, however, only partially confirmed, as we find a positive effect of male 
management on men’s satisfaction, while there is no difference between joint and female 
management. We further find confirmation that well-being for women depends on their access 
to money, yet separate management prevails over joint management, in contrast to our 
expectation that joint management could also improve their financial situation.  
Income and management regimes interact. The relative impact of women’s contributions 
depends on the type of money management employed by both men and women. The financial 
satisfaction of women will vary depending on their income contributions and whether male and 
female management of finances are implemented; male management reduces the positive effect 
of a woman’s income share in comparison to female management, confirming in part 
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hypothesis 3. Also, the effect of management regimes is particularly visible at higher levels of 
women’s income share and when women out-earn men. Women who adopt separate 
management regimes achieve the highest financial satisfaction for the same level of income 
share while a joint management regime, contrary to the initial hypothesis, does not contribute 
to the accumulation of advantage for women.  
In opposition, the decline in male financial satisfaction due to a higher income share of women 
is greatest when women manage the finances. Male breadwinner ideology is thus reflected not 
only in the male reaction to a woman’s dominant income, but also in their different level of 
satisfaction with various models of household financial management. In other words, female 
management of finances moderates downwardly the main effect for couples that change 
towards this typology and thus experience lower male financial well-being than average 
couples when female contribution levels increase.  
The within-group comparison of Swiss couples in which female income share exceeds 35% 
indicates that male financial satisfaction is more stable and less affected by woman’s income 
once men control the finances, underlining the importance of the executive control of money 
for men’s financial well-being. A strong male breadwinner ideology is thus in place, 
confirming in part hypothesis 3: we demonstrate that both earnings and executive control over 
money are necessary to provide a complete picture of the bargaining process and the economic 
well-being of partners.  
Heterogeneous effects. Interesting patterns emerge in different types of households: 
characteristics such as a couple’s relationship investment in the form of children, type of 
relationship, or total income matter. Yet, in line with previous research (Hamplova, Le 
Bourdais & Lapierre-Adamcyk, 2014; Kulic, 2013), married and childless couples are probably 
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the major drivers of observed relationships for the whole population and are perhaps more 
susceptible to societal norms. 
In conclusion, family behavior is a complex process resulting from the interactions between 
family income, type of relationship, relative income contributions of partners and money 
management, and general gender ideologies. These aspects act together to create a pattern of 
within-household advantage and disadvantage. On the one hand, male reliance on the type of 
management that most closely reproduces the breadwinner model reduces women’s bargaining 
power. On the other hand, women obtain additional power by relying on non-traditional forms 
of money management, thus advocating against gender norms. Therefore, management 
regimes can alter inequalities and the dynamics within households may mirror dominant gender 
models and ideologies. 
Unfortunately, our study does suffer from lack of clarity on the definition of executive 
management, which, as self-reported, might hide both strategic control and executive 
management (Vogler, 1998). The theory indeed distinguishes between two types of power: 
power over strictly executive decisions and power over strategic decisions, with the latter often 
used as a proxy of power relations within the household. Future studies would benefit from a 
nuanced distinction in order to provide a more thorough explanation of how everyday financial 
and spending decisions relate to an individual’s well-being. Furthermore, our study focuses 
only on couples that remain together throughout the survey; couples that separate are excluded 
from our observations. Since women’s relative income might affect the probability of divorce 
and separation (Bertrand et al., 2015; Rogers, 2004), it is possible that the effect of relative 
income in our study is downwardly biased. An interesting integration of this study would be to 
look at how the dissolution of a relationship is linked to financial management regimes, and 
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